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ABSTRACT.  
Foucault is often considered to be the commensurate theorist of power. His late work provides 
an impressive array of concepts that enables a multi-dimensional analysis of the historical, 
material, and discursive facets of power. What is missing from this approach** is the factor of 
passionate attachments, or what we might term the sublime motivations that underlie any 
regime of control. Lacan’s ethical thought prioritizes precisely the issue of the sublime, and, 
more to the point, the process of sublimation which establishes an effective “short-circuit” 
between socially valorized objects and direct drive satisfactions of individuals. Key here is the 
notion of das Ding, the place of the absent object of primordial satisfaction that generates 
libidinal enjoyment and draws the subject toward the pinnacle of social valorization. Lacan thus 
shows us what Foucault cannot theorize. That is to say, if sublimation consists of a relation to 
the real of das Ding, then it cannot be limited in the terms of its activation to the powers of 
discursive domain alone; it remains a self-initiating and self-regulating form of power. 
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Sublime Motivations 
The work of Michel Foucault has proved an important influence in the arena of the critical and 
theoretical psychology that Theory & Psychology has done so well to explore over the last 20 
years. This has proved the case not only methodologically (Hook, 2001; Ibanez, 1991; Yates & 
Hiles, 2010), but also in terms of plotting the relation between power and subjectivity (Amigot & 
Pujal, 2009; Guilfoyle, 2007; Hook, 2003; Joy, 1993). While the current paper wishes to make a 
contribution to this literature, it hopes to do so via means of an adjunct to Foucault’s 
theorization of power provided by another French intellectual whose work has itself gained 
increasing prominence in Theory & Psychology over the last several years (Dunker, 2008; 
Malone, 2000, 2007, 2008; Parker, 2005, 2008; Shingu & Funaki, 2008; Vanheule & Verhaeghe, 
2001; Webb & Sells, 1995): Jacques Lacan.  
What is often elided in more polarizing comparisons of Foucault and Lacan’s work 
(Copjec, 1994) is the fact of an important parallel: both theorists, at particular moments in their 
work, turn their attention to the topic of ethics (Rajchman, 1991). Lacan’s most developed 
engagement with this subject occurs in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1992). Foucault’s ethical 
turn forms part of his elaboration of the notion of technologies of subjectivity in the 1980s. This, 
as I will go on to argue, proves to be a telling comparison, one which reveals a potential 
weakness in Foucault’s ethical thought. Although his late conceptualizations of 
power&mdash;his influential notions of governmentality, biopolitics, disciplinarity, and so 
on&mdash;prove indispensable to any contemporary analytics of power, this formidable array 
of concepts nonetheless fails to grasp a crucial element in the maintenance of power. It is 
precisely in view of the Foucauldian approach to ethical technologies of the self, I claim, that we 
can isolate a crucial failing: the sublime motivations or “passionate attachments” underlying 
regimes of control. 
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My objective is not to dismiss the value and perspicacity of the above Foucauldian 
notions. To the contrary, one of my concerns lies with the question of how certain Foucauldian 
analytical devices might need to make reference to the unlikely ally of psychoanalysis so as to 
overcome blind-spots introduced by an unwavering methodological commitment to 
genealogical historicism. Put differently, one might&mdash;oddly enough&mdash;express a 
fidelity to Foucault even by way of recourse to psychoanalysis. An original line of speculation 
might be opened up in this way, by asking what extra-discursive powers of “the real”&mdash;as 
opposed to productive ensembles of discourse&mdash;might come to be enlisted in the 
establishment of workable apparatuses of control. We should thus ask: what modes of 
impossibility, that is to say, what impasses of desire, what forms of libidinal enjoyment 
(jouissance) are implied (if not in fact presumed) within the conjunctions of 
power&ndash;knowledge that Foucault understands within the logic of the dispositif?  
Ethical Technologies of Self 
Given that I have discussed Foucault’s notion of ethics in some detail elsewhere (Hook, 2007), I 
will limit myself to providing only a minimal outline here. For Foucault, and scholars like Dean 
(1999) and Rose (1991, 1996) inspired by this period of his work, ethics is comprised of the 
“conduct of self-conduct”, those techniques of self whereby individuals affect a variety of 
operations “on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being” (Foucault, 
1988c, p. 18).  Of great importance for Foucault (1988d) is the fact that a potential gap 
separates normalizing, regulative technologies of subjectivity from their individualized activation 
and rearrangement. In the case of the former we have a series of regulative discursive routines 
of self-knowledge and practice that are articulated in the norms of health and betterment. In 
the case of the latter we have the properly ethical domain of the personalized, indeed, aesthetic, 
 4 
care of the self. This, in rudimentary terms, is the basic distinction between normative morality 
and ethical individuality. 
One of the strengths of this account, certainly for scholars like Rose, is that it shows how 
the realm of ethical individuality is all too often over-determined by the values and practices of 
prevailing normative (and normalizing) morality. That is, Foucault’s account of technologies of 
subjectivity enables us to plot the downward saturation of power, to capture the interchange 
between structural apparatuses of influence and the micro-politics of self in such a way that we 
are able to understand how “deeply” private and personalized practices of self are already 
political operations linked to the broader objectives of the governmentality of the state. 
Now while** it is important to note that the ethical technologies of self discussed by 
Foucault (1988a, 1988b)&mdash;unlike those analysed by Rose (1991)&mdash;are drawn from 
a wide historical range, and are not always thus linked to explicitly normalizing expertise, or, 
indeed, delimited by the protocols of disciplinary knowledge. Nonetheless, despite that for the 
later Foucault (1988b) there is the possibility of ethical practices of freedom, this 
conceptualization nonetheless** still runs up against a problem. Foucault’s ethical technologies 
of self seem oddly bloodless, detached from any motivating passions, lacking in affective 
intensity. Such a depiction hardly accords with the raptures of practice presumably 
accompanying the vigour of the ascetic preoccupations that Foucault (1988a, 1988b) himself 
discusses, such as those of spiritual, dietary, or sexual discipline. These are not practices without 
a libidinal dimension; they are often linked precisely to “sublime” aims, to “the goals,” to quote 
Foucault (1988c) “of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection and immortality” (p. 18) that are, for 
man, worth living and dying for.  
What is it, then, we should ask, that drives and inspires such practices? Not surely** 
simply the banal impetus of the “ideals of scientific, political and philanthropic experts” (Rose, 
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1991, p. 213), the life-objectives prescribed by today’s generic norms of subjectivity? Surely** 
these targets have to be understood against the context of a far more passionate set of 
attachments, especially so if we are to account for the subject-driven impetus to which Foucault 
so often alludes? 
We are here approaching the realm of the sublime, of something not motivated merely 
by biopolitical regulation, disciplinary normalization, or diffused technologies of subjectivity and 
governmentality, however dispersed or discontinuous, for, indeed, it is often precisely against 
such forces of the sublime&mdash;as in the case of the racist “national Thing” invoked by Žižek 
(1993)&mdash;that the state is obliged to act. Switching to a psychoanalytic register, one would 
say we have arrived at the question of the drives and their social mediation, or, more 
particularly, at the challenging issue of the drives in relation to sublimation, to what is accorded 
the highest values in a culture.  
The Dilemmas of Sublimation 
 
Lacan devotes the second section of Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1992), to the 
problem of sublimation, to revising this key notion of Freudian thought that by 1959 had 
become so riddled with contradictions that its ongoing viability as a clinical tool was under 
serious threat. He opens with a clarification, underlining the fact that in sublimation one is 
dealing with the positive side of ethical thought, not with prohibitions and moral conscience, 
but with “moral and spiritual elevation” (p. 87).  Many similar qualifications&mdash;such as the 
idea that there can be no complete sublimation&mdash;will follow in Lacan’s attempt to clear 
the way to a more workable understanding of the concept of sublimation. 
A paramount concern in dealing with the confused state of the concept of sublimation 
lies with asserting the very plasticity of the drives. In opposition to the more gentrified view 
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offered by ego psychology, Lacan affirms that there is no pre-accommodation of the drives 
animating the human organism to its world, no natural fit of objects to impulses, no ultimate 
resolution of the spectrum of drives into a unified genital form. 
the libido, with its paradoxical, archaic so-called pre-genital 
characteristics, with its eternal polymorphism, with its world of 
images … linked to different sets of drives associated with different 
stages … [evidences for us that] the whole microcosm has absolutely 
nothing to do with the macrocosm. (Lacan, 1992, p. 92) 
What we are contending with in the drive is the irreducible character of archaic forms of libido; 
such “aspirations” will never yield to full domestication: we are dealing with “a point of 
departure and a nucleus that is never completely resolved under … primacy of genitality or a 
pure and simple Vorstellung [idea]” (p. 93). In addition to the issue of the irreducible character 
of the archaic libido&mdash;i.e., the original recalcitrance of the drives, the fact that they never 
yield to full domestication&mdash;is the consideration that the drive has the resources of 
apparently limitless possibilities of substitution as regards its ostensible goal.  
Already, then, the convergence of drive attentions onto a prescribed set of socially 
valorized goals seems unlikely, but the problem is more pronounced yet. We have also to take 
into account the fact that sublimation involves a change of objects, a change, as Lacan notes, 
chiming with Freud’s demands in Three Essays on Sexuality (1905/1966c), “that doesn’t occur 
through the intermediary of a return of the repressed nor symptomatically … [but] in a way 
which satisfies directly” (Lacan, 1992, p. 94). There is no apparent disjunction here, no 
redirection via the means of the symptom. (The methodological contrast with Foucault’s 
privileged methodological concept of discontinuity is already pronounced here.)** Furthermore, 
insists Lacan (1992), sublimation cannot be collapsed into reaction-formation; it is not a 
defensive reaction that takes the form of the opposite impulse to what is socially prohibited. 
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Nor crucially, for Freud (1905/1966c), is sublimation to be understood via the mechanics of 
repression. Freud** asks us not only to believe that the polymorphous field of sexual libido 
settles on a rather limited set of objects&mdash;where, moreover, it is able to find direct 
satisfaction&mdash;he asks us also to accept that these are “socially valorized objects of which 
the group approves … objects of public utility” (Lacan, 1992, p. 94).  
We need ask: given the amazing latitude within which libidinal gratifications may be 
achieved&mdash;not to mention the variety of substitutions afforded drive-
impulses&mdash;then why the regularity and intensity of investment in objects of collective 
cultural value? Lacan (1992) immediately warns against what would appear an intuitive solution, 
the idea, in short, that we might resolve this difficulty by means of reference to “a simple 
opposition and a simple reconciliation between the individual and the collectivity” (p. 94). There 
is something too convenient about this move for Lacan, whereby the collective finds its 
satisfaction where the individual is already libidinally invested. Moreover, it not only poses a 
singular autonomy on the side of the subject’s libido (the coherence of “individual satisfaction” 
in and of itself), it also implies a pre-destined integration of drive and environment that cannot 
but strike one as anathema to Freudian theory. Besides, Lacan reminds us, there is a further 
complication to consider here: Freud’s declaration that sublimation is a process of object rather 
than ego libido. 
To say that sublimation represents a fortuitous outcome to a potentially endlessly 
convoluted trajectory is an understatement. One thing seems clear after having surveyed the 
dilemmas of sublimation: Lacan’s best explanatory hope lies not in the attempt to trace the 
endless complexity of a given libidinal genealogy, but rather in identifying the conditions of 
possibility underlying this field of permutations. The enigma of how a short-circuit is set up 
between socially valorized objects and direct drive satisfactions of the individual subject is 
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something previous psychoanalysts have attempted to resolve by looking at the attributes of the 
objects of sublimation themselves (at how they may function as “stand-ins” for the mother, for 
instance), and at vicissitudes of the drive that may modulate its course without fundamentally 
compromising its directness. Lacan, predictably, follows a different course. He eschews the 
attempt to trace the road-map of libidinal interest and their transformations; he likewise avoids 
tracking the idiosyncratic developments in the subject which would explain the extraordinary 
contingency whereby the plasticity of the “triebe” (drives) happen to find direct expression in 
society’s most prized activities and objects. He prefers instead to explore more carefully what 
underlies this knotted complex of factors, to examine the necessary structural conditions 
underlying such archaic libidinal activity. The same point can be made by citing Lacan (1992): in 
the case of sublimation we should look predominantly “neither to the field of the intersubjective 
subject, [nor to] the subject subjected to the mediation of the signifier, but [rather to] what is 
behind this subject” (p. 103). 
The Field of das Ding 
Lacan’s response to the dilemmas of sublimation is enabled via an ingenious piece of inter-
textuality. He identifies what is ostensibly the same element in two otherwise chronologically 
and thematically diverse aspects of Freud’s oeuvre. The “ding”** of Project for a Scientific 
Psychology (Freud, 1950/1966b) is, he claims, one and the same as the primordial “object” of 
satisfaction, the “Wieder zu finden”, the will to find again, present in the late (Freud, 
1925/1966a) paper on negation. The Wieder zu finden is what for Freud “establishes the 
orientation of the human subject to the object” (Lacan, 1992, p. 58). The whole progress of the 
subject takes its cue from das Ding, this mythical “proto-object” which lies “[r]ight at the 
beginning of the organization of the world in the psyche, both logically and chronologically”, and 
which provides the point “around which the whole adaptive development revolves” (p. 57).  
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In the Project Freud (1950/1966b) makes a point about the subject’s constitutive mis-
adaptation to reality, which he links to their** inability adequately to apprehend the other, 
indeed, to a constitutive absence in psychic life. Freud’s assertion is troubling not only in view of 
a commitment we might have to any rudimentary psychological realism&ndash;an affront, in 
other words, to the view that the subject directly knows their** empirical domain&mdash;it is 
troubling also in view of the limitations it places on inter-subjectivity, on our ability ever truly to 
know one another. In a section of the Project much valued by Lacanians, Freud (1950/1966b) 
takes the example of an infant’s perceptual engagement with another person: 
the perceptual complexes proceeding from this fellow human-being 
will in part be new and non-comparable … but other visual 
perceptions … will coincide in the subject with memories of quite 
similar impressions of his own body. … Thus the complex of the fellow 
human-being falls apart into two components, of which one makes an 
impression by its constant structure and stays together as a thing, 
while the other can be understood by the activity of memory … traced 
back to information from [the subject’s] own body. (p. 331) 
This is a crucial passage. For a start, it emphasizes that the child’s initial interest in the other has 
much to do with the fact that “an object like this was simultaneously [their] first satisfying … and 
hostile object, as well as [their] sole helping power” (p. 331). There is thus a possibility of re-
finding pleasure here, in this object that simultaneously invokes the mother and the care she 
represents, and the prospect of a primal aggressiveness. This is not the only psychical filter 
which characterizes the subject’s relationship to their** fellow being. The cognitive and 
perceptual information of this other is assimilated only via the subject’s experiences of their** 
own body, by the route of their** own foregoing experience. Arresting as these two modes of 
estrangement might appear&mdash;the facts that the other is known via its potential for 
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pleasure/hostility, or through the prism of the subject’s image of him- or 
herself**&mdash;neither is sufficient to explain what is most fundamentally alien in the other, 
this “thingness” which defies recuperation into either inter-subjectivity or the terms of the 
reality principle. It is worth stressing here the factor of negativity. What knits psychological 
reality for the subject, what makes it cohesive, is not an attunement to reality and its objects, 
but rather a kind of subtraction. As Copjec (1994) avers, “it is only when our perceptions come 
to refer themselves to … [the] lost object of satisfaction that they can be deemed objective” (p. 
233). This object is now excluded from our perceptions of mere worldly objects despite that “it 
now functions as that which is ‘in them more than them’” (p. 233). 
Given the dense series of formulations that Lacan will develop from his re-
conceptualization of the Freudian ding**&mdash;particular** in relation to pure desire and the 
primacy of an unconscious Law that over-rides “the good”&mdash;it helps to focus on what, for 
psychoanalysis, is a familiar domain of exemplification: the primordial relation to the mother. 
One can speak of the mother as “the maternal thing” Lacan (1992) claims, “insofar as she 
occupies the place of … das Ding” (p. 67). Having said this, he** is immediately alive to the 
reductive capacity of such an equation, even as he is aware of the importance of the initial 
location of the mother within the coordinates of das Ding. (“Kleinian theory”, Lacan notes, in the 
ambivalent tone characteristic of his discussions of Klein, “depends on its having situated the 
mythic body of the mother at the central place of das Ding”; p. 106). Importantly then, while 
Lacan clearly does want to understand the relations of the subject to something 
primordial&mdash;indeed, in terms of “its attachment to the … most archaic of objects” (p. 
106)&mdash;he nevertheless wishes to avoid the fixity of a singular, “nuclear” object and its 
variants. He prefers instead to provide an operational definition of the field of das Ding which 
establishes the framework for such relations, for such Things.  
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The Force of Subtraction 
When it comes to sublimation, then, Lacan is less interested in the redirection of drives than 
with the opening up of a space, with a vacuum of jouissance. This voracious absence is strictly 
coterminous with that aspect of the other which evades human recognition, with that thing-like 
element which cannot be retrieved into symbolic or imaginary registers. In the case of das Ding 
we are dealing with the vanishing-point of humanity, with the radical alterity of the 
Nebenmensch (neighbour), with a blind-spot in psychical and moral apprehension that cannot 
be overcome, even by the most sincere attempts at empathy or inter-subjectivity. Such an 
unknowability cannot be reduced merely to “otherness”; it is tantamount instead to a cavity of 
desire, a “swallowing abyss” that inculcates a response&mdash;indeed, an economy of 
attraction and avoidance&mdash;within the subject. Lacan has thus substituted for the lost 
primordial object of jouissance, a place, a power of emptiness, which makes such an object 
possible.  
Like the hollowness of the vase which for Heidegger (1969) defines its 
function&mdash;“If the vase may be filled,” says Lacan (1992), “it is because … in its essence it is 
empty” (p. 120)&mdash;this is a thoroughly paradoxical emptiness. Hence Lacan’s comments: 
“the Thing … is there in a beyond, … the Thing is not nothing, but literally is not” (p. 63). This is a 
nihil&mdash;a nothingness turned inside out, as one might put it&mdash;which engenders a 
kind of being; a nothing with a generative capacity. It is a fully positivized absence, an 
“extracted” structural space for which there is no pre-ordained object, and for which there can 
be no perfect fit. Nonetheless, like the black hole to which it is often compared, das Ding exerts 
a potent gravitational field, and in so doing it elicits sublime passions&mdash;and, wagers Lacan, 
effects of creation&mdash;ex nihilo, out of a void. This, then, is the productive force of 
subtraction which is able to bring Things into existence on the basis of its sheer emptiness. So 
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although no single object can occupy this space indefinitely, an ongoing succession of “sacred” 
cultural objects and practices will be resident here, assuming, at particular historical junctures, 
the sublime status according such a position.  
What Lacan achieves with this conceptualization is to connect more explicitly the 
inassimilable foreignness that is das Ding to the impossible object of the Wieder zu finden. More 
than this, he pinpoints the place of the primal object of desire, isolating thus** the pull of a 
radical form of desire which must remain empty, never finally embodied in any one object. He 
thus sets us on the track of a psychoanalytic ethics, which is an ethics of the fidelity to the empty 
form of desire itself (Neill, 2007; Zupančič, 2000) over and above the particularity of any of its 
instantiations. 
The extraordinary object status of das Ding helps Lacan resolve&mdash;or at least 
clarify&mdash;certain of the paradoxes of Freud’s object of “primordial satisfaction”. We are 
presented here with an ostensibly negative ontology. This is an object, thought to embody a 
type of full jouissance, which the subject never possessed but that remains nevertheless more 
real&mdash;certainly in its ability to inculcate desire&mdash;than anything that they do;** an 
object that is strictly irretrievable despite our incessant attempts at its (impossible) re-finding. 
This is an object, moreover, that puts into play a fantasmatic prehistory: what we never had is 
now the “what came before”, and that which is fundamentally inaccessible is that which we 
believe we can enjoy once again. 
There is a further complication involved in Lacan’s re-conceptualization of the 
primordial object of desire. This “proto-object” of das Ding is both that which inaugurates an 
original division in the experience of reality&mdash;the division which sets desire in 
motion&mdash;and that “from within the subject which finds itself led to a first outside” (Lacan, 
1992, p. 52). How, then, are we to resolve this contradiction in which das Ding, the “first 
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outside”, correlates to something within the subject, without deferring to a naïve account of 
projection, something which Lacan clearly wishes to avoid? It helps to reiterate again** here 
that we are not speaking simply of an object of perceptual reality, an object in the 
phenomenological field which corresponds to a representation the subject has in mind, but of 
the Wieder zu finden to which the perceptual work of finding “real objects” is subordinated. This 
is not as such an issue of “reality correspondences”, but of** an abyss that opens up amongst 
the objects of the everyday world, a vacuum that is the unavoidable structural counterpart of 
the pull to re-find the object of satisfaction. The recalcitrance of this lost satisfaction and the 
void it leaves in the subject is strictly coterminous with the unsatisfactory nature of worldly 
objects, with the drive to re-find the impossible object of jouissance. It is for this reason that 
Lacan (1992) remarks that “das Ding is at the centre only in the sense that it is excluded”, 
advancing furthermore “[t]hat …in reality das Ding has to be posited as exterior … [as] 
something strange to me, although … at the heart of me” (p. 71).  Hence Lacan’s subsequent 
formulations in the same seminar concerning the notion of the “excluded inside” or “extimacy”, 
that is, the intimate exteriority of the Thing. It is for the same reason that Žižek (2000) offers a 
description of das Ding as the Thing from inner space.** 
Law Ex Nihilo 
The above suffices as a summary of what is set in play by the force of das Ding as a “proto-
object”, or, more accurately, as the evacuated object of desire that is co-extensive with the 
radically vacated place occupied by the sublime. Not only, then, are we confronted in das Ding 
with the founding of desire: this absence evokes for us, in its empty abyssal aspect, the 
possibility of a primordial enjoyment that has long since been voided, and whose replacement 
remains an impossible imperative. We are destined as such to confront a succession of 
secondary objects that pale in comparison to a former satisfaction, to something bigger, more 
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gigantic in libidinal value. What results is precisely a kind of massification whereby das 
Ding&mdash;despite that its presumed satisfactions cannot be accessed, despite that it has no 
object-existence&mdash;looms larger than the perceptual reality of everyday objects. 
We must not neglect the fact that das Ding is for Lacan the epicentre of jouissance, it is 
“enjoyment incarnated”, a vortex that exerts upon us the fascination of a consuming enjoyment 
that we desperately hold at bay even as it draws us ever closer in. Lacan evokes in this respect 
the etymological link in French between “to search” and “detour” to ground his description of 
this, the magnetic field of attractions and repulsions implied by the presence of das Ding. There 
is thus a push&ndash;pull relation, a type of suspension in operation which necessitates that we 
don’t come too close, that we keep our distance. This is how Lacan understands the regulations 
of the pleasure principle in Seminar VII, as that which governs the search for the object in such a 
way that detours and avoidances play an integral role, and that result in an orbiting motion, a 
monitored distance “from that which it gravitates around”, such that “[t]he object to be found 
confers on the search its invisible law” (Lacan, 1992, p. 58).  
The automatic regulation of an orbiting distance to a “full” jouissance that would 
consume us, this asymptotic line of approach is what for Lacan underlies the persistence and the 
apparent universality of the incest taboo. We are dealing here with the instantaneous 
generation of an unconscious law, a law of distance, of prohibition&mdash;and here we find a 
longstanding anthropological conundrum&mdash;not simply generated within or by culture but 
which is, by contrast, sometimes treated as the basis for culture itself.  It is a law for which we 
are able to find innumerable justifications and reasons&mdash;a law which culture no doubt 
institutionalizes and obeys&mdash;despite that it predates such proscriptions. We have thus the 
odd convergence that Lacan points to of that which is prohibited and that which is anyway 
impossible. 
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The Position of the Thing 
This is what a Foucauldian analytics fails to grasp in its insistence on grounding the complex 
historical and discursive causes underwriting various developments of power: the spontaneous 
emergence&mdash;and, indeed, the great tenacity&mdash;of an unconscious law that regulates 
the relation to the Thing. This is a law before culture, certainly before discursive constructions, 
that various cultural and symbolic institutions are able to use as their affective base. The “grey, 
meticulous and patiently documentary” (Foucault, 1984, p. 76) work of detailed genealogical 
analysis will register the effects of such nodal points of libidinal investment without being able 
to adequately explain them. The apparent ex nihilo emergence of such a law, and its structural 
necessity within the field of jouissance and desire, means that it is not easily rooted in the 
genealogical field of contingent material forces and discursive power-relations.  
We are in a better position now to appreciate the well-known Lacanian definition of 
sublimation as “the object elevated to the dignity of the Thing” (Lacan, 1992, p. 112) and how it 
might apply to a critique of Foucault. As noted above, Lacan bypasses a particular route of 
analytical engagement in his account of sublimation, a route which, interestingly enough, might 
be said to correspond to aspects of Foucault’s genealogical tracking of the formative powers of 
technologies of subjectivity. Rather than relying on the steady accumulation of layer upon layer 
of historical data, embarking on a search that tackles “a field of entangled and confused 
parchments … documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times” (Foucault, 
1984, p. 76), Lacan opts instead to isolate the necessary conditions of possibility underlying 
sublimation. He thus avoids what a Foucauldian framework of technologies of self implies it can 
provide: an itinerary connecting a given subject’s practices and objects of 
sublimation&mdash;that is, the privatized or individualized domain of ideals (in Foucault’s terms, 
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ethics)&mdash;to what is sacred to or valued by a culture&mdash;that is, the vaunted ideals of 
a particular culture and its technologies of subjectivity (for Foucault, the realm of morals).  
Lacan’s approach, by contrast, is to point to a necessary structural place around which a 
culture’s select objects and practices come to coalesce. Rather than painstakingly tracing all of 
the multiple permutations whereby the influence of sublime cultural objects come to be 
effectively individualized, he opts to looks to what functions as a precondition of such varied 
lines of articulation and influence. By focusing on das Ding as the proto-object, or, more 
accurately, as the object-place, he avoids the detoured circuit of a modulated drive across the 
varying and changing terrain of a culture’s most valued objects: das Ding is always, as it were, 
the direct “unmediated” drive target. The methodological privileging of discontinuity here is to 
miss the point. 
In more straightforward terms, it is the structural place which is primary, not the objects 
or practices which come to occupy this place, which are of course subject to considerable socio-
historical variation. Moreover, it is not the direction of the drive that is changed, 
diverted&mdash;as in other psychoanalytic theorizations&mdash;what is changed is the status 
of the object, its position in the structure of fantasy. This object, which under different 
conditions may be pathetic, deplorable, wholly undesirable, is, to borrow Kay’s wonderful 
phrase, “thoroughly irradiated by the drive, bathed in jouissance, transfigured, spiritualized and 
resplendent” (Kay, 2003, pp. 54&ndash;55) once it is elevated to this position. One needs 
emphasize here the radically inter-subjective status of fantasy in Lacanian theory, the fact that 
fantasmatic objects are always the response given to the vexing question of what the “big 
Other”&mdash;the amassed embodiment of a given social-historical-cultural network of 
values&mdash;is imputed to want. Never merely private, then (or, indeed intra-subjective), a 
fantasy is always a negotiated outcome, a hypothesis generated by an individual’s or a society’s 
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best guess at what its Other most desires. Importantly, then,** the concept of the Other 
operates both at the level of the individual subject and at that of the imaginary of a given 
society. As De Kesel (2009) makes clear, the same holds for the notion of sublimation. To this we 
should add the immediate qualification that these two registers of sublimation are intimately 
connected. Indeed, in light of the trans-individual nature of unconscious 
subjectivity&mdash;which for Lacan is constantly generating answers to the enigma of what the 
Other wants&mdash;these orders of fantasy can never be fully separable: subjective fantasy 
occurs within the parameters of the Other, within the realm of the signifier. 
This, then, is where we find the short-circuit between the recalcitrance of archaic 
libido&mdash;primal drive aspirations&mdash;and socially valorized objects. And to be sure, 
this is a short-circuit not only between drive and culture, but between the subjective and the 
collective. Inasmuch as the drive reaches towards the objectives provided by the coordinates of 
(radically inter-subjective) fantasy, this drive will directly and “automatically” be put on course 
towards the cultural Thing. 
Why, then, does this notion of the Thing make for such a crucial contribution to the 
theorization of psychical power? Why, furthermore, does it deliver such a telling blow to the 
empirico-historicist Foucauldian enterprise of tracing multiple (if discontinuous) lines of 
causality within the over-arching schema of disciplinary bio-power? It is crucial because it makes 
clear that you do not have to be acted upon to sublimate, to produce versions of das Ding that 
both tie you into a culture and lock you into **regimes of adherence, reverence and distance 
relative to it. Just as das Ding is not the result of repression, so it is equally not the result of even 
a positive or proactive coercion, of Foucault’s productive powers of technologies of subjectivity. 
Das Ding is not to be located within the rationality of effects; it is not a produced effect but is 
instead a precondition of a variety of effects. One must here agree with Dolar (1999): many of 
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the disciplinary/governmental outcomes that Foucault seizes upon in his later genealogical 
works may thus be explained, at least partially, without reference to the complicated 
apparatuses and attenuated rationalities of governmentality. Indeed, the latter may be said to 
presuppose a variety of psychical mechanisms, of which the orchestrations of sublimation would 
seem crucial. 
Via his re-conceptualization of the Freudian problematic of sublimation, Lacan shows us 
what Foucault cannot theorize, namely the fact of a self-instantiating form of productive power 
that does not require a direct causative connection to a heterogeneous ensemble of material 
forces and discursive practices. If sublimation consists of a relation to the real of das Ding, then 
it cannot be limited in the terms of its activation and ongoing insistence to the powers of the 
discursive domain alone; it remains rather a self-initiating and self-regulating form of power. In 
das Ding, then, we have a prospective answer to the question with which we opened concerning 
a particular “mode of impossibility”&mdash;that is, an impasse of desire linked to a mobilization 
of jouissance&mdash;that enables power, that so extends the reach of the ensembles of 
power&ndash;knowledge, the technologies of subjectivity, studied by Foucault.  
Paradigms of Sublimation 
Let me close with a series of questions. What might be the dispositif of a particular order of 
sublimation? Differently put: could sublimation itself function as a category of historical analysis? 
Given the intersection of conceptual frameworks implied by such a question&mdash;the 
conjunction, in other words, of Foucauldian and Lacanian approaches, whose incompatibility is 
typically presumed&mdash;many would query whether this is even a viable research question. 
Perhaps it is. Take, for example, Lacan’s (1992) description of the emergence of the courtly love 
tradition, which he views as the “appearance, articulation, establishment, of a whole moral 
code … a whole ethic, a whole way of life” (p. 125). Clearly, then, courtly love is more than a 
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mode of writing, a discursive style; it entails a series of prescribed norms of interaction and 
behaviour, and, more than this, specific codes that function to regulate the relations between 
man and woman. In this brief discussion of historicized (“ethical”) codes of behaviour there is 
greater proximity between Foucault and Lacan than we may have expected. 
This discussion of the courtly love tradition cannot be ignored on the basis that it lacks 
sufficient historical contextualization. Moreover, the addition of further layers of empirical 
analysis will not necessarily deepen our understanding of the longstanding cultural importance 
of such phenomena. Lacan’s point is precisely that once one has examined the requisite social, 
political and economic evidence, “applied all the available modes of interpretation of the 
superstructure”, historians are still at a loss to account for the endurance “success of this 
extraordinary fashion” (Lacan, 1992, p. 125). 
What this opens up is a distinctive and promising analytical perspective, one that 
welcomes the precision of socio-historical contextualization as part of its attempt to apprehend 
what Leader (2002) refers to as “paradigms of sublimation”&mdash;in other words, those 
frames of ethical sensibility and practice that have gained hegemonic ascendance at particular 
historical junctures. Courtly love would seem a perfectly viable subject of consideration for a 
Foucauldian analytics able to plot the lateral spread of such codes, values and behaviours across 
a variety of particularized institutional settings and discursive practices. One could argue that 
this is the limitation of Žižek’s (1993) recourse to one particular paradigm of sublimation, that is, 
his frequent use of explanations of the national Thing: they are not adequately informed of the 
texture of a variety of multiple institutionalized realizations, of the modulations underlying the 
gradual transformation of one version of the Thing into another. To be perfectly clear then: my 
suggestion here is by no means that a Lacanian perspective on impasses of desire simply 
negates a Foucauldian project. By contrast, the Lacanian notion of paradigms of sublimation 
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offers the prospect of a novel, additional category for a Foucauldian analysis of historically 
specific variants of power. 
There is a related consideration. We have established that das Ding evades retrieval into 
symbolic or imaginary registers. The fact of this place, the fact of its operation, and the 
unconscious law it entails, cannot thus be said to be constructed; they are not subject to 
deconstruction. Having said that, Lacan is aware that the field of das Ding, let us say the various 
objects that come to occupy this position, becomes the focus of imaginary, cultural and indeed 
manipulative political elaborations. There is in this sense a continual attempt to colonize the 
field of das Ding; this, after all, is for Lacan (1992) “how collective, socially acceptable 
sublimations operate” (p. 99). This opens up an important question: how might it be possible to 
de-sublimate certain cultural Things, to use de-sublimation as a political strategy? 
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